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My viewpoint is that of a defense attorney who principally defends 
corporations or business people in financial crimes.  Because of this, virtually 
every case I encounter includes relevant conduct issues, particularly the 
amount of money involved in the crime.  It seems to me that enhancing 
punishment based upon relevant conduct, which is established by a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, is clearly contrary to the notions of 
fairness and due process that have been a part of criminal justice system from 
the beginning.  It runs contrary to the presumption of innocence and to the rule 
that there has to be a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.  It seems to me 
that, at a minimum, the standard should be clear and convincing evidence, but 
frankly, I think beyond a reasonable doubt is the preferable standard.  It would 
be consistent with our traditions.  In addition, I think that in the process of 
determining relevant conduct, more attention should be paid to the issues of 
due process. 
Let me talk briefly of some of the problems that I experience in the way 
the current system is administered. 
Quite often the relevant conduct involves stale evidence.  It is difficult for 
a defendant to go back and try to resurrect facts that would exculpate him of 
the relevant conduct.  This is true particularly in the financial crimes area 
where schemes may go on over a long period of time.  The preponderance of 
the evidence standard virtually dictates a government outcome.  I think it is 
almost inevitable. 
There are questions as to whether the rules of evidence apply in sentencing 
hearings, and I think that as a practical matter there are serious issues of the 
right of confrontation in evidence hearings. 
Another problem – I see this particularly in the fraud and tax area, in 
business crimes, and in government program fraud – is that the government 
will frequently claim as relevant conduct, acts that would be too technical or 
too unclear to ever be brought as a criminal case standing on its own.  But in a 
relevant conduct context, with a preponderance of the evidence standard, such 
things are fair game even though in the real world they would never form the 
basis for a criminal case. 
Most defendants lack the resources to investigate government claims of 
relevant conduct, much less contest them in court.  The court also lacks 
resources.  The United States Probation Office is not equipped to conduct 
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sophisticated financial investigations or indeed sophisticated criminal 
investigations of any sort.  That is not their function.  Defendants are neither 
equipped to conduct detailed investigations of stale conduct nor conduct 
extended sentencing hearings to resolve some complicated issue of fact 
involving, for example, the Medicare regulations.  As a consequence, the 
government’s version of relevant conduct is virtually always accepted.  
Moreover, I have had experiences where Assistant U.S. Attorneys tell me they 
will not go forward with the plea bargain if there is any dispute about the pre-
sentence investigation. 
I would not necessarily say that the prosecutors are the source of that 
problem.  I think that is a reflection of judges’ distaste for conducting lengthy, 
detailed and controversial sentencing hearings.  The prosecutors are really 
reflecting the wishes of the district judges.  On the subject of sentencing 
hearings, few hearings are held.  I have never been involved in one, and I do 
not know many defense lawyers that have been.  I will tell you, though, that 
the view is that if you choose to have an extended sentencing hearing to 
dispute some of these relevant conduct issues, you are going to lose whatever 
benefits you get from the plea bargain because you are going to be sentenced at 
the maximum range just as though you had gone to trial rather than pleading 
guilty.  Is that a correct perception?  I do not know.  But it is a perception that 
is out there. 
I would recommend that the Guidelines explicitly permit the government 
and the defense to stipulate to the relevant conduct or the lack thereof.  I 
understand that puts more discretion in the hands of the prosecutors and the 
defense attorneys, but their bargain is going to reflect their assessments of the 
strengths of their cases.  Particularly in the area of financial crimes 
stipulations, where the amount of money involved can be a reflection of all 
kinds of bargaining, I think that a stipulation of that nature should be binding 
upon the court unless there is a finding of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
